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THE.CARIBBEAN, BASIN PLAN OR INITIATIVE 
Some comments 
A few weeks ago, the U.S. President, Mr. Ronald Reagan, submitted 
through an address at the OAS and his bill for supplemental aid sent 
to Congress, the main features of the well-publicized "Caribbean 
Basin Initiative" (or alternately Plan or Program). 
It is of common knowledge that since the "oil crisis" the 
Caribbean Basin countries (including Central America and the Caribbean 
Islands) have been seriously affected not only by the escalating cost 
of imported oil, but also concurrently by the declining prices of their 
major exports. This contributed to worsening the deep-rooted structural 
problems of those countries, causing serious inflation, increasing 
unemployment, declining GDP growth, and enormous balance of payments 
deficits. 
For most of those countries, this worsening economic trend has 
been considered as a potential fountain of political and social unrest, 
and according to one expressed opinion "this situación is being fueled 
and exploited by Cuba acting as a proxy of the Soviet Union". The 
Initiative or Plan submitted by Reagan to Congress in order to improve 
the afore-mentioned situation in the Caribbean Basin envisions in 
broad lines, among other steps, the elimination of all duties on 
all imports from the Basin, except textiles and apparel, and other 
products with less than the minimum amount (25%) of local content. 
The granting to U.S. investors in the Caribbean Basin of significant 
incentives to encourage private investment. 
A supplemental economic assistance of $350 million to key Caribbean 
countries whose situation is particularly critical. 
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That would bring the total U.S. assistance appropriation for 
the area to nearly $825 million during the Fiscal Year 1982. The 
military assistance included in this program would amount to a 19.1% 
of the total. 
This "Initiative" has been received with mixed feelings by the 
interested peoples of the Caribbean Basin as well as by other observers 
and personalities in the U.S. This has been mentioned in a memo sent 
immediately after the Reagan remarks to the Organization of American 
Sates on February 24, 1982. It is the purpose of•this memo to submit 
some additional comments to the prior ones. It will be done in two 
parts. In the first will be levelled at some criticisms of the 
"Initiative" itself by some groups whose interest are threatened by 
the eventual application of the program. The second will consist of 
some personal reflections ori the same topic. 
I. Recent criticisms of the "Caribbean Basin Plan" 
Very recently, some additional criticisms have been levelled by 
some labor groups and Congressmen at the Caribbean Basin Plan. The 
most significant of them, appeared in some U.S. reviews and newspapers. 
(Three sets of them are remembered here). 
As it was legitimately expected, the labor groups, especially 
through the AFL/CIO, are denouncing the trade and tax incentives 
saying that the miseries already brought by nearly 9 per cent U.S. 
unemployment can be aggravated by encouraging U.S. firms to move 
business out of this country, thereby putting more Americans out of 
work. 
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Next, the Congressmen's position regarding the Caribbean Plan 
is a mixture of faint praise and skepticism, since the package is 
generally viewed from all quarters ^s a cover up to funnel more U.S. 
aid to combat the so-called "Cuban or Marxist threat" against some 
countries of the area, especially El Salvador, which will receive the 
lion's share of the assistance. In general, there is agreement among 
the Congressmen that while the assitance program is positive, it is 
at the same time insignificant, and will not have major impact in 
the region. 
Finally, in the views of other groups, the economic assistance 
would fomr part of a long-range strategy conceived by the Reagan . 
Administration in order to emphasize bilateral loans at the expense 
of multilateral lending program, such as of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB). A Congressman said: 
"It amounts to 'robing Peter to pay Paul." Indeed some credence has 
been lent to this opinion by the recent publication of the Treasury 
Department entitled "United States participation in the Multilateral 
Development Banks in the 1980's", where criticisms are levelled at 
the functioning of those institutions while at the same time are 
envisioned some ways to diminish the U.S. contributions to them. 
II. Some personal views 
At first glance, the assistance program offered by the U.S. 
Administration is timely and generous. Its success will depend on 
the socio-political environment prevailing in the targeted countries, 
and the continuity of the assistance until the intended countries attain 
the threshold of some kind of self-sustainable socio-economic growth. 
Regarding the first aspect, it is evident by itself that the 
socio-political framework, since it can act as a stimulus or a brake, 
is a necessary ingredient of the development process. This can be 
scarcely accomplished in a socio-political environment characterized 
by government or dictatorship protecting against the vast majority of 
the people the interest of small minorities as is often the case in 
most countries of the area, with the conspicuous exception of Costa 
Rica, and in some instances Panama. Recent studies published by CEPAL 
show that the wealthiest 2% of the population in the area enjoy between 
20 and 30% of the personal income, while at the extreme opposite, 40% 
of the poor receive usually less than 13% of the same total. This 
unequal distributive structure runs against the economic development 
and the social stability of those countries. Regarding the first 
aspect, it can be noted, for instance, that the adcumulation of the 
wealth in a reduced minority favors not the needed internal reinvestment 
in those same countries, but is transfered outside. According to 
the Washington Post issue of March 26, 1982 "The Caribbean Initiative 
envisions increasing the formation of investment capital at a rate 
of $500 million a year, when about one billion dollars of local 
capital is flowing out of those countries annually." 
On the other hand, the ravage of illiteracy, malnutrition, high 
illness and mortality rate resulting from the low income of the 40% 
or half of the population of those countries is a propitious manure 
for violent or revolutionary escapes. It is so and it will be so 
while the overwhelming majority of the people cannot obviously have 
any hope for a better future. In order to prevent such violent 
the disruptions of socio-economic environment, some audacious reforms 
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are needed as previous conditions for any significant and stable 
socio-economic progress. 
\ 
Otherwise, as taught by the past experience, whatever the 
amount of the external assistance, it will be either of scant effect 
on the national improvement of the socio-economic situation of those 
countries, or diverted once more to the wealthiest 2 or 5% of those 
people. 
Obviously, it goes without saying that the socio-political 
reforms will doubtless require internal support arid external comprehension, 
especially in those countries ruled by authoritarian regimes protecting 
minoritarian interests. 
The second afore-mentioned aspect is related to the creation 
of some kind of sane or proper basis for economic development. Since 
the resources basis of those countries, especially those of the Caribbean 
Islands is very narrow, even more so when compared with the pressure 
involved in the high density of the population per some measure of 
space, it will be very difficult for them to attain by themselves 
some level of economic growth without the external assistance both 
in terms of financing and technology. Brushing aside details, it 
could be said that the granting of this assistance should be broadly 
subordinated to two aspects, besides the previous socio-political 
reforms aforementioned, and some kind of control oveir the use of the 
assistance. 
The first aspect is linked with the conditions and destination 
of the external assistance. Since most of the intended countries 
are characterized by lack or deficient socio-economic infrastructures, 
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the significant part of this assistance to be devoted to this sector 
that includes road, hospital, harbour, school building, etc.. (only 
productive in the long run), should be granted in most part on a 
concessionary basis, at least for some agreed period of time. Otherwise, 
the interest payment and amortization of the assistance given in form 
of loans will trap some of those countries into a vicious circle, 
condemning them to choose between payment of debts and investment for 
improving their socio-economic lot. 
The second aspect to be taken into account is' the continuity 
of the assistance. To be effective, it should be extended over some 
previously agreed period of time (doubtless varied according to 
the initial level of development of each country), until those 
countries can walk on their own feet. The minimum of ten consecutive 
years appears to be suitable for most of those countries. In this 
regard, it must be noted that in the recent past, the U.S. assistance 
concept has not been alien to the philosophy of the fire-fighters, i.e. 
being granted for a short term, only when and where forms of governments 
approved by Washington were threatened. This has been partly the cause 
for abrupt discontinuity in the development process. The examples of 
this behavior abound. The "Alliance for Progress" for instance was 
conceived in the wake of the Cuban revolution, and from fear of 
its spreading through the Latin American side of the continent. Today, 
some sectors of opinion are tempted to link the "Caribbean Basin Plan" 
with the Castrist threats to the rest of the area, after the Nicaraguan 
revolution. The impression tends to be pervasive, that Caribbean and 
Central American people should be grateful to Cuba for the assistance 
received from the U.S. 
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For the benefit of both the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin 
people, it is time for the U.S. to unleash its socio-economic aid 
concept for the Caribbean area from, the traditional "fire-fighter" 
philosophy. 
Raoul G. Nelson 
CEPAL Washington 
1 March 1982 
Remarks by President Reagan about the United States 
Plan of Assistance to the Caribbean Basin Countries 
The long awaited speech of the President of the United States 
of America spelling out his program to deal with the socio-economic 
problems affecting the Caribbean and Central American countries and 
threats to their political stability was delivered at the OAS 
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., on February 24, 1982. 
The speech is broken into two parts: an economic package 
introduced by some general consideration about the situation of the 
area, and the strategic assessment of the Caribbean-Central American 
region with emphasis on the "dark shadow of Cuba." The following 
development will concentrate exclusively on the first part and 
present some comments about it by some leading personalities and 
publications. 
Importance of the Caribbean Basin to the United States 
In his introduction to the economic package, Reagan began by 
commenting on the large size reservoir of the Hemisphere's population 
(around 600 million people), the enormous natural resources, and the 
big markets that should enable all the people of the Americas to attain 
high standards of living. Also recalled were some characteristics 
that make the countries of the Caribbean and Central America vital 
strategic and commercial arteries for the United States. El Salvador 
for instance, he said, is nearer to Texas, than Texas is to Massachusetts 
Nearly half of U.S. trade, two thirds of U.S. imported oil, and over 
half of its imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal 
or the Gulf of Mexico. That means that the well-being and security 
of the people in the Caribbean region are in U.S. own vital interest 
They are, however, at the moment under economic siege. In 
1977, one barrel of oil was worth 5 pounds of coffee or 155 pounds 
of sugar, to buy that same barrel of oil today, these small countries 
must provide five times as much coffee (nearly 26 pounds) or almost 
twice as much sugar (283 pounds). This economic disaster is consuming 
the money reserves and credits of those countries at the same time 
that it provides a fresh opening to the enemies of freedom. 
Main features of the Caribbean Basin program 
The main paragraphs of the address spelling out the essential 
points of the program will be mentioned, in order to avoid possible 
misunderstandings: 
a) In the view of Mr. Reagan, the centerpiece of the program he 
is about to send to Congress for approval, is free trade for Caribbean 
Basin products exported to the U.S.; currently some 87% of those 
exports enter U.S. markets duty free under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). They, however, cover only the limited range of 
existing products not the wide variety of potential ones these people 
are capable of generating. Under the free trade arrangement being 
proposed, exports from the area will receive duty free treatment for 
12 years. Thus, new investors will be able to enter the market 
knowing that their products will receive duty free treatment for at 
least the pay-off lifetime of their investments. Before granting 
duty free treatment, the U.S. Government will disucusss with each 
country its own self-help measures. 
The only exception to the free trade arrangement will be 
textile and apparel products because they are governed by other 
international agreements. However, the U.S. Government will make 
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sure that its inmediate neighbors have more liberal quota arrangements. 
In the U.S. President's view, this economic proposal is unprecedented, 
since U.S. has never before offered a preferential trading arrangement 
to any region. 
A caveat however: even as those economies grow, all the protections 
now available to U.S. industry, agriculture and labor against disruptive 
imports will remain. 
b) To further attract investment, the Congress will be asked to 
provide significant tax incentives for investment in the Caribbean Basin. 
The U.S. Government stands ready to negotiate bilateral investment 
treaties with interested Basin countries. 
c) The President is asking for a supplemental fiscal year 1982 
appropriation of $350 million to assist those countries which are 
particularly hard hit economically. Much of this aid will be concentrated 
on the private sector. In his view, these steps will help foster the 
spirit of enterprise necessary to take advantage of the trade and 
investment portions of the program. 
d) The U.S. will offer technical assistance and training to assist 
the private sector inthe Caribbean Basin to benefit from the opportunities 
of this program. This will include investment promotion, export 
marketing and technology transfer efforts- as well as programs to 
facilitate adjustments to greater competition and production in 
agriculture and industry. The purpose is to seek the active partici-
pation of the business community in this joint undertaking. The Peace 
Corps already has 861 volunteers in the area and will give special 
emphasis to recruiting volunteers with skills in developing local 
enterprises. 
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e) The U.S. will work closely with Mexico, Canada and Venezuela 
-all of whom have already begun sustantial and innovative programs 
of their own- to encourage stronger international efforts to coordinate 
the U.S. own development measures with their vital contributions and 
with those of other potential donors like Colombia. Also encouraged 
will be the European, Japanese, and other Asian allies, as well as 
multilateral development institutions to increase their assistance in 
the region. 
f) Given its special, valued relationship with Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, the U.S. Government will propose special 
measures to ensure that they also will benefit and prosper from this 
program. They can play leading roles in the development of the area. 
Mr. Reagan concluded -and this is the major part of his address-
by drawing attention to the dangers involved in attempts by outside 
powers (for instance Cuba, Nicaragua and their Soviet backers) to 
exploiting or fomenting troubles in Central America and the Caribbean. 
"Let our friends and our adversaries understand, he finally said, that 
we will do whatever is prudent an d necessary to ensure peace and security 
of the Caribbean Area." 
Comments, remarks about the statement of the President 
It might be useful to elicit first some paragraphs of the message 
of the President that will or could need further elaboration, before 
citing some viewpoints expressed by some private persons or officials 
about the same. 
As it could be noted, there was not enough emphasis on the fact 
that the only amount of $350 million mentioned in the speech was a 
supplemental, additional one. It is only part of a package that 
will bring the fiscal 1982 total economic assistance to the region 
to $823,9 million or $403 million more than in fiscal year 1981. 
The lack of clarification of this aspect has led to some confused 
comments about the speech. 
Also worthy of more elaboration is the one-way free trade 
provision in favor of the Caribbean Basin, that the U.S. has for the 
first time offered to an area. This proposal, however, can raise 
some delicate trade issues: in the case of sugar, for example, 
most countries in the Caribbean already export sugar duty-free to 
the U.S. under the Generalized System of Preference (GSP). The 
exceptions are the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Panama. It 
has not been clearly explicited in the speech what is in store for 
these countries, specially for the Dominican Republic, a significant 
producer of sugar in the Caribbean Area. 
In the same vein, the reservations about textile trade will 
need some elaboration. 
Finally, also to be clarified is the geographic coverage of the 
Caribbean aid package. Since the President stated clearly that "we 
seek to exclude no one" of the assistance program, did he mean that 
Cuba and other allegedly "Cuban proxies" like Grenada, Nicaragua 
could eventually be considered for assistance? 
Now it might be useful to mention some viewpoints expressed by 
private and official persons about the message of the President. 
In general, leaders throughout the Caribbean Basin gave a 
warm welcome to the speech, especially Jamaica's Prime Minister, 
P. Seaga who called it "bold, historic and far-reaching in concept." 
Some of them, however, expressed more mixed feelings, since the largest 
share of the direct aid would go to El Salvador, and in decreasing 
amount to Costa Rica and Honduras. This originated the complaint, 
said the Washington Post, that the United States "will always do 
anything for a country fighting off Cuban supported guerillas, but 
nothing for a hard-pressed democracy as long as it;conducts its 
affairs peacefully and legally." 
The Mexican Foreign Minister, J. Castañeda, who indicated 
previously that his government would join the U.S. in a coordinated 
economic aid plan for the area, thought the part of the speech dealing 
with economic assistance was constructive and useful. As for the 
political aspect he said, reflecting his President's opposition to 
foreign military intervention in the area, "I thought it was rather 
strong." 
Also mixed were the feelings of some congressional leaders. 
The liberals, while praising those aspects of the plan aimed at 
combating poverty in the Caribbean area, expressed "concern at 
Reagan's insistence on relating the program to his controversial 
El Salvador policy and his ideological preachments agains communist 
Cuban influence in the Hemisphere." 
On the conservative side of the Congress there was favorable 
support, although somewhat a little cautious, some predicting that 
at a time of internal economic hardship reinforced by heavy domestic 




Finally, as expected, the Cuban Government which was mentioned 
in the speech as a culprit for the situation in the area, lashed 
back calling the speech a "mixture of lies, cynicism and threats", 
and the total amount of the aid "ridiculous." It is an attempt, it 
said, to involve the countries of the area in the politics of cold 
war. " 
* * * 
The New York Times editorial of the day following the speech 
(24 February 1982), concluded: "Indeed the President left the impression 
that if it were not for those reds in Cuba and Central America, no 
urgent aid might really be needed. That gives Fidel Castro the 
credit for opening Washington's purse -an odd message indeed." 
